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N reviewing criminal cases of the past year, we see that our courts are
interpreting the United States and Texas Constitutions identically as
they deal with confessions, searches, and seizures. Harmless error
analysis is routinely applied, and both state and federal appellate courts
give credence to trial court fact-findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
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Courts determine a confession's voluntariness by considering the total-
ity of the circumstances.' Some of the circumstances considered this
year, but held not to preclude admissibility, were the following: mental
retardation, 2 lengthy interrogation and sleep deprivation, 3 ignorance of
the statement's consequences, 4 intoxication, 5 and delay in interrogation.6
A confession is voluntary if under all the circumstances it is a product
of the defendant's free and rational choice,7 in the absence of official
overreaching, either by direct coercion or subtle psychological persua-
sion.8 It is involuntary if official, coercive conduct makes it "unlikely to
have been the product of essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker."9 And if a statement is induced by a promise of some benefit to
the defendant, made or sanctioned by one in authority, and is likely to
influence the defendant to speak untruthfully, it is involuntary. 10
Some of the following factors may be considered in determining
whether a defendant's will has been overborne: length of detention, pro-
longed interrogation, or whether the suspect is held incommunicado, de-
nial of access to a family member, refusal of suspect's request to call a
lawyer, and physical brutality.''
B. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
In determining whether a person is in custody, the court will again con-
sider the totality of the circumstances.12 As applied to interrogation, a
person is in custody when he or she has been formally arrested or when a
reasonable person would believe that his or her freedom of movement
1. See Harner v. State, 997 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet. h.);
Humphries v. State, 993 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1999, pet. ref'd); Pace v.
State, 986 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet. ref'd); Tinlin v. State, 983
S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd); United States v. Mullin, 178 F.3d
334, 341 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 454 (1999); United States v. Posada-Rios,
158 F.3d 832, 866 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub. nom., Murga v. United States, 119 S. Ct.
1280 (1999), Parada v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1487 (1999), Rios-Castano v. United States,
119 S. Ct. 1792 (1999).
2. See Jones v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 29
(1999); Harner, 997 S.W.2d at 700.
3. See Barnes v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1768 (1999).
4. See id.; Humphries, 993 S.W.2d at 830.
5. See Pace, 986 S.W.2d at 748.
6. See Mullin, 178 F.3d at 342.
7. See Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 866.
8. See Mullin, 178 F.3d at 342.
9. Tinlin v. State, 983 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd) (quot-
ing Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)); In re M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d
319 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (quoting Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199,
211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
10. See Humphries v. State, 993 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1999, pet. ref'd).
11. See Pace v. State, 986 S.W.2d 740, 747 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet ref'd).
12. See In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 287 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
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was restricted to the degree associated with a formal arrest. 13
The Miranda warnings as codified in the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure apply only to statements made during custodial interrogation.1 4
"[I]f an investigation is not at the accusatorial or the custodial stage, a
person's Fifth Amendment rights have not yet come into play and the
voluntariness of [those rights] is not implicated.' 15
"Pre-arrest silence is a constitutionally permissible area of inquiry" for
the prosecution at trial. 16 On the other hand, a prosecutor may not use a
defendant's post-arrest silence substantively or for impeachment. 17
C. ORAL STATEMENTS
Texas, of course, is the only state that has requirements for oral confes-
sions exceeding those of written statements. Recently, the court of crimi-
nal appeals and intermediate Texas appellate courts reiterated that if an
accused's oral statement contains even a single fact assertion unknown to
law enforcement at the time, but later found to be true and conducive to
establishing his or her guilt, the statement is admissible in its entirety.' 8
D. RECORDED (TAPED) STATEMENTS
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 provides greater pro-
tection to the accused than the United States Constitution provides. The
key requirements are that the recording be a fair and accurate represen-
tation of the statement, that it not be altered, and that all voices on the
tape be identified. These requirements having been met, the Texarkana
court of appeals held a recording admissible, even though the investigat-
ing officer did not know who turned on the recording machine, did not
know the extent of that person's training, or whether he or she was
competent.19
E. JUVENILES
Texas courts enforce the legislature's clear intent to reduce an officer's
impact on a juvenile in custody. 20 Failure to strictly observe all Family
Code provisions applicable to juvenile interrogation will render a confes-
13. See id. at 284-85; Chiles v. State, 988 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).
14. See Fiedler v. State, 991 S.W.2d 70, 79 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
15. Id. at 80.
16. Peters v. State, 997 S.W.2d 377, 388 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet. h.)
(quoting Waldo v. State, 746 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
17. See United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 835 (2000).
18. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), pet. for cert. filed,
(Jan. 4, 2000) (No. 99-8315);' Cameron v. State, 988 S.W.2d 835, 845 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 1185 (2000); Guevara v. State, 985 S.W.2d
590, 593 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet ref d).
19. See Falcetta v. State, 991 S.W.2d 295, 297-98 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).




II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. IN GENERAL
It is safe to say that under current law, the Texas Constitution affords
no greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the
United States Constitution. Indeed, in at least one area-that of the re-
quirement of a warrant-it may offer less. 22 Texas courts are generally
following the United States Supreme Court's lead in search and seizure
cases. Virtually all the Texas cases in this area are primarily analyzed in
light of the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Texas Constitution.
This year, the courts reminded us that the Fourth Amendment does not
forbid all searches and seizures-only unreasonable ones, 2 3 and that one
complaining of a search must have a reasonable expectation of privacy.24
The Supreme Court told us that the extent to which the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people depends upon where those people are. Thus, an
overnight guest in a home has a legitimate expectation of privacy and
may properly claim the Amendment's protection, but one who is merely
present with the consent of the householder may not.25
The Supreme Court also pointed out that in deciding whether a partic-
ular governmental action violates the Fourth Amendment, it will first de-
termine whether the action was regarded as an unreasonable search and
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed. If that
inquiry is fruitless, it will evaluate the search or seizure under traditional
standards of reasonableness by weighing the degree of intrusion upon the
individual's privacy against the degree to which the search or seizure is
needed to promote legitimate governmental interests. 26
The Fifth Circuit noted that the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment is an objective one, wholly divorced from the subjec-
tive beliefs of police officers. "[S]o long as police do no more than they
are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in
doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry. '27
As to what constitutes a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes, a
person is "seized" when he or she is "subjected to application of physical
21. See In re C.R., 995 S.W.2d 778, 785 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied); In re
L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 287 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
22. See Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
23. See Walter v. State, 997 S.W.2d 853, 859 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. granted);
Schenekl v. State, 996 S.W.2d. 305, 309 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed).
24. See Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Rovnak v. State, 990
S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd); Hypolite v. State, 985 S.W.2d
181, 185 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
25. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
26. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
27. United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 78 (1999), and cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 309 (1999).
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force or the person submits to an assertion of authority. '28
B. ARREST, STOP, OR INQUIRY WITHOUT WARRANT
As to traffic stops, an officer's observation of a traffic violation is suffi-
cient authority for an officer to stop the vehicle and to detain the passen-
ger for investigative purposes. It is also probable cause to arrest the
driver.29 And when a police officer lawfully arrests an occupant of an
automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile. 30 Furthermore, it
does not matter if the search occurs before or after the arrest, so long as
probable cause to arrest existed before the search.31 Certainly, the occu-
pants of a stolen vehicle have no reasonable expectation of privacy to
challenge its search.32
"An investigative detention or stop is a brief detention of a person rea-
sonably suspected of criminal activity to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more informa-
tion."' 33 It is distinguished from an "arrest," which "occurs when a per-
son's liberty of movement is restricted or restrained. ' 34 An officer must
have articulable suspicion to make a stop-less than probable cause-
since a stop is less intrusive than an arrest.35
In order to justify a pat-down search of an individual during a deten-
tion, a police officer need not have probable cause to arrest. Instead,
"the issue is whether a reasonably prudent person in the same circum-
stances would be warranted in the belief that his or her safety or that of
others is in danger. ''36
A valid consensual encounter with police need not be supported by
probable cause or even articulable suspicion. The test for determining
whether an encounter with police qualifies as a valid consensual encoun-
ter is that set out in Florida v. Bostick.37 The issue is "whether the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the per-
son was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter. [The test] applies whether the encounter takes place on a
28. Schenekl v. State, 996 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed); In
re J.M., 995 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
29. See Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 837 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet.
ref'd).
30. See State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Reasor v. State,
988 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999), rev'd 2000 WL 228439 (Tex. Crim.
App. Mar. 1, 2000).
31. See Ballard, 987 S.W.2d at 892.
32. See Busby v. State, 990 S.W.2d 263, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 803 (2000).
33. Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 838.
34. Id.
35. See United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 332 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 83 (1999); Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 837.
36. Carmouche v. State, 989 SW.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.-Beaumnont 1999, pet.
granted), vacated w.r.m., 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2000).
37. 501 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991).
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city street, in an airport terminal, or on a bus."'38
C. AFFIDAVITS SUPPORTING SEARCH WARRANTS
"Whether the facts alleged in a probable cause affidavit sufficiently
support a search warrant is determined by examining the totality of the
circumstances. '39 The affidavit must contain facts "within the affiant's
knowledge and of which the affiant has reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious person's belief that the
offense has been committed and the evidence to be seized is at the partic-
ular place to be searched. '40 The task of the magistrate evaluating a
probable cause affidavit is to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, based on the facts set out in the affidavit, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at a par-
ticular place. And the magistrate may make reasonable inferences from
the information contained in the affidavit.41
D. SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANTS
Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they qualify as one
of the court-created exceptions to the general rule that a search must be
conducted pursuant to a warrant. And the state has the burden to show
that a search comes within an exception.42 It is not very difficult to do so.
A warrantless search of an automobile is permissible if conducted pur-
suant to a lawful impoundment.
Reasonable cause for impoundment may exist when: (1) the vehicle
has been used in the commission of a crime; (2) an unattended vehi-
cle is abandoned, illegally parked, or otherwise endangering other
traffic; (3) the driver is incapacitated and unable to remove the vehi-
cle; or (4) the driver is removed from his [or her] automobile, placed
under custodial arrest, and his [or her] property cannot be protected
by any means other than impoundment. 43
Of course, the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest is excepted
from the requirement of obtaining a warrant.44 And once a person has
been arrested and is in jail, the clothing he was wearing when arrested
may be searched without a warrant, since it is lawfully within the custody
and control of the police. The expectation of privacy is lowered in arrest
and detainment situations.4 5
38. State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 440 (1991)).
39. Mahmoudi v. State, 999 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet.
ref'd).
40. Wynn v. State, 996 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet. h.).
41. See Shavers v. State 985 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. ref'd).
42. See Rovnak v. State, 990 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd).
43. Lagaite v. State, 995 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet.
ref'd).
44. See In re J.M., 995 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
45. See Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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Where a police officer has reasonable cause to believe, for example,
that if a search were delayed to obtain a warrant, serious bodily injury or
death might result, the "emergency" or "exigent circumstances" doctrine
allows an immediate, warrantless search.46 A non-exhaustive list of fac-
tors that may be considered in determining whether exigent circum-
stances exist are:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary
to obtain a warrant; (2) the reasonable belief that contraband is
about to be removed; (3) the possibility of danger to the police of-
ficers guarding the site of contraband while a search warrant is
sought; (4) information that the possessors of the contraband are
aware that the police are on their trail; and (5) the ready destructibil-
ity of the contraband and the knowledge that efforts to dispose of
narcotics and to escape are characteristic ... of persons engaged in
the narcotics trafficking. 47
Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement covers
items in plain view of police officers when the officers are where they
have a right to be.48
Warrantless "inventory searches" of automobiles-including the
trunks-are conducted after arrests as standard police policy. 49 They are
proper if they are "conducted pursuant to standardized regulations and
procedures that are consistent with (1) protecting property of the vehi-
cle's owner; (2) protecting the police against claims or disputes over lost
or stolen property; and (3) protecting police from danger. '50
In addition, the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's
search warrant requirement has no separate exigency requirement. If
probable cause exists to search the car, no warrant is required. 51 And it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may
conceal the object of the search. This rule applies to all containers within
the car, without qualification as to ownership and without a showing of
individualized probable cause for each container. Both passengers and
drivers have a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to property
they transport in cars.52
On the other hand, when an officer stopped a motorist for speeding,
but issued him a citation rather than arresting him, he was not constitu-
tionally authorized to conduct a full search of the car, even though he had
probable cause to make a custodial arrest.53
46. See Shavers, 985 S.W.2d at 288.
47. United States v. Morales, 171 F.3d 978, 982 (5th Cir. 1999).
48. See Reasor v. State, 988 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999), rev'd
2000 WL 228439 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2000).
49. See Jurdi v. State, 980 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd).
50. United States v. Lage, 183 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
1179 (2000), and cert. denied, sub. noma., Diaz v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1180 (2000).
51. See Maryland v. Dyson, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2014 (1999).
52. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999).
53. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1998).
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E. CONSENT TO SEARCH
Another exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements is a search conducted with the consent of the person
searched. Consent must be freely and voluntarily given, and voluntari-
ness is determined from the totality of the circumstances. It must not be
the product of duress or coercion, nor is it mere acquiescence to a claim
of lawful authority. 54 The standard for measuring the scope of consent is
that of objective reasonableness, that is, what the typical reasonable per-
son would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect. 55 The burden of proof is on the state to show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the consent is voluntarily given.56
III. CONCLUSION
Our overview of this year's confession, search, and seizure decisions
reflect a status quo in the law. We see that Texas courts will continue to
afford the accused the same protections guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and that those protections are only increased where Texas'
statutory laws require it.
54. See Harris v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, pet. ref'd).
55. See Melugin v. State, 989 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,
pet. ref'd).
56. See Sanchez v. State, 982 S.W.2d. 929, 930-31 (Tex, App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
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